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I. INTRODUCTION 
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,1 Chief 
Justice John Roberts cast the deciding vote to uphold the individual 
mandate of the Affordable Care Act.  Speaking for the Court in Part III-
C of his opinion, Roberts found that the individual mandate was 
properly enacted pursuant to the General Welfare Clause.2  Two aspects 
of his opinion in particular drove this result.  In deciding whether the 
individual mandate constitutes a “tax” within the meaning of the 
Constitution, the Chief Justice engaged in realistic analysis rather than 
legal formalism.3  In addition, Roberts reasoned that, if fairly possible, 
the statute had to be construed in such a way as to render it 
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1. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012). 
2. Id. at 2594-2601. 
3. Id. 
17 
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constitutional.4  The confluence of realist analysis and the presumption 
of constitutionality resulted in a decision ruling that the Court should 
uphold the individual mandate as a proper exercise of Congress’s power 
to tax.5 
Part I of this essay discusses the significance of this ruling in light 
of its political, medical, and economic consequences.  Parts II and III 
contrast the formalist approach used by Justice Roberts in finding that 
the individual mandate was not a “tax” within the meaning of the Anti-
Injunction Act with the functional approach he used in finding that the 
individual mandate is a tax for purposes of the General Welfare Clause. 
Part IV describes how Justice Roberts deferred to Congress in 
considering the constitutionality of the individual mandate. 
II. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS CASE
On June 28, 2012, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality 
of all but one provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (PPACA).6  The Court issued its decision in a set of consolidated 
appeals under the title National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius.  The opinion of Chief Justice Roberts in this landmark case is 
the only opinion to even partially command a majority of the justices. 
Four justices joined Part II and Part III-C of Roberts’ opinion in finding 
that the federal Anti-Injunction Act did not apply7 and in upholding the 
constitutionality of the “individual mandate,” the requirement that all 
American citizens must have health insurance.8  Moreover, it appears 
that the rest of Roberts’s opinion constitutes the narrowest grounds for 
the Court’s decision upholding the expansion of Medicaid:9 ruling that 
the States are free to opt out of Medicaid expansion without losing 
existing funding10 and finding the remainder of the PPACA is 
4. Id. at 2600-02. 
5. Id. at 2601. 
6. See id. at 2608 (upholding the entirety of the Affordable Care Act except for a provision
that would have allowed the federal government to withhold funding from the existing Medicaid 
program from any state that declined to enroll in the expanded Medicaid program).  
7. See id. at 2582-84 (finding that the individual mandate is not a “tax” within the meaning
of the Anti-Injunction Act). 
8. See id. at 2594-2600 (upholding the individual mandate as a “tax” within the meaning of
the General Welfare Clause). 
9. See id. at 2603 (upholding the expansion of the Medicaid program). 
10. See id. at 2601-07 (striking down a provision of the Act that permitted the federal
government to withhold existing Medicaid funding from a state that refused to expand its Medicaid 
program). 
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“severable” from the single provision that was struck down.11  
Accordingly, even though the remainder of Roberts’ opinion is not 
joined by a majority of the justices, it may have precedential weight 
under Marks v. United States.12 
The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case is of the utmost 
significance in a number of respects.  Politically, universal health care 
has long been the holy grail of progressives in America.13  The road 
toward universal health care had been slow but steady.  In 1965, 
Congress enacted Medicare for the elderly and Medicaid for the 
indigent,14 and over the years it has continuously expanded both of those 
programs.15  Congress has also adopted several laws expanding 
protection for persons who have employer-provided health insurance, 
including ERISA (1974),16 COBRA (1985),17 and HIPAA (1996).18  But 
11. See id. at 2607-08 (finding the remainder of the Act to be severable from the
unconstitutional provision). 
12. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1977) (in the case of a split majority,
the narrowest reasoning of the Justice supplying the decisive vote should be considered the 
reasoning of the Court.).  See also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2585-93 (Roberts, C.J.) 
(finding that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to enact the individual mandate).  In Part III-A of his opinion the Chief Justice ruled that the 
individual mandate exceeded Congress’s power to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, a conclusion that the four dissenting justices also arrived at.  It is 
not clear whether this portion of the opinion represents a holding of the Court or whether it is obiter 
dictum.  Compare id. at 2600-01 (Roberts, C.J.) (contending that it was necessary to determine 
whether the individual mandate was constitutional under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and 
Proper Clause in order for the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to apply to the analysis under the 
General Welfare Clause), with id. at 2629 n.12 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (stating, “I see no reason to undertake a Commerce Clause analysis that is not outcome 
determinative.”). 
13. See Zoe Clark, Congressman Dingell: “I know my father who started this fight is smiling
from up above,” MICH. RADIO NEWS FOR MICH. (June 28, 2012, 1:30 AM), 
http://michiganradio.org/post/congressman-dingell-i-know-my-father-who-started-fight-smiling-
above; Julie Rovner, Rep. Dingell: The House’s Link To Health-Care History, NPR (Nov. 6, 2009), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120159308.  Rovner states: 
Dingell’s quest for universal health care began in 1932, when his father, John Dingell 
Sr., was first elected to the House from Michigan. The elder Dingell quickly became one 
of the architects of the New Deal. 
. . .  
. . . In 1943, the elder Dingell, along with Senators Jim Murray of Montana and Robert 
Wagner of New York, introduced the first national health insurance bill.  The so-called 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell bill was fought over for years, though it never became law.  
And when the elder Dingell died in 1955, John Dingell Jr. took over not only his father’s 
seat, but also his quest for national health insurance. 
14. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 2863 (1965). 
15. See, e.g., Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (expanding Medicare coverage for prescription drugs). 
16. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (regulating the operation of employer health benefit plans). 
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the premise of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act is that 
every American should have access to comprehensive, high-quality 
health care through the subsidized purchase of affordable health 
insurance.19  Generations of Americans have struggled to extend 
adequate health care to the working class.20  This law is a very 
substantial step towards the ultimate goal of universal health care. 
From the standpoint of public health, the United States ranks 37th 
in the world.21  According to numerous studies, our nation trails nearly 
every other industrialized country in measures such as expected lifespan 
and infant mortality.22  One leading study states: “[i]t is hard to ignore 
that in 2006, the United States was number 1 in terms of health care 
spending per capita but ranked 39th for infant mortality, 43rd for adult 
female mortality, 42nd for adult male mortality, and 36th for life 
expectancy.”23 
17. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat.
82 (1986) (entitling employees to purchase continuing health insurance coverage after termination 
of employment). 
18. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 
(1996) (improving medical privacy and limiting restrictions that group health plans can place on 
coverage for preexisting conditions). 
19. See Barack Obama, President Obama Signs Health Reform into Law, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Mar. 23, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/photos-and-video/video/president-obama-signs-health-
reform-law#transcript (“And we have now just enshrined, as soon as I sign this bill, the core 
principle that everybody should have some basic security when it comes to their health care.”). 
20. See id.  President Obama stated: 
I’m signing this bill for all the leaders who took up this cause through the generations—
from Teddy Roosevelt to Franklin Roosevelt, from Harry Truman, to Lyndon Johnson, 
from Bill and Hillary Clinton, to one of the deans who’s been fighting this so long, John 
Dingell.  (Applause.)  To Senator Ted Kennedy.  (Applause.)  And it’s fitting that Ted’s 
widow, Vicki, is here—it’s fitting that Teddy’s widow, Vicki, is here; and his niece 
Caroline; his son Patrick, whose vote helped make this reform a reality.  (Applause.). 
See also note 13 supra and accompanying text. 
21. See World Health Org., World Health Report 2000, WORLD HEALTH ORG., (2000) 
available at http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/. 
22. See Health Status, OECD.STAT EXTRACTS, 
http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT (last visited Oct. 28, 2012) 
(showing lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality for Americans compared to the people 
of other industrialized countries); Ellen Nolte & Martin McKee, Variations in Amenable 
Mortality—Trends in 16 High-Income Nations, 103 HEALTH POL’Y 47, 47-52 (Sept. 12, 2011), 
available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/In-the-
Literature/2011/Sep/Variations-in-Amenable-Mortality.aspx (showing that America had the highest 
rate of “amendable mortality” that is,—deaths that could have been prevented with appropriate 
health care); The Commonwealth Fund, Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: How the Performance of the 
U.S. Health Care System Compares Internationally, 2010 Update, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND 
(June 23, 2010), available at http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Content/Publications/Fund-
Reports/2010/Jun/Mirror-Mirror-Update.aspx?page=all [hereinafter Mirror, Mirror 2010]. 
23. Christopher J.L. Murray & Julio Frenk, Ranking 37th—Measuring the Performance of
the U.S. Health Care System, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2010 98, 98-99 (Jan. 14, 2010), available at 
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The PPACA holds out the promise of alleviating the suffering of 
tens of millions of Americans.24 
In addition, for better or for worse, this massive piece of legislation 
will also have dramatic economic consequences for the United States. 
The health care industry constitutes one-sixth—soon to be one-fifth—of 
the American economy.25  It represents the largest component of 
government spending and is the principal driver of government budget 
deficits.26  Over sixty percent of bankruptcies in the United States are 
caused in substantial part by health care costs.27 Because the cost of 
health insurance has risen far faster than income,28 there has opened a 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp0910064#t=article. 
24. See Cathy Schoen, Michelle M. Doty, Ruth H. Robertson & Sara R. Collins, Affordable 
Care Act Reforms Could Reduce the Number of Underinsured U.S. Adults by 70 Percent, 30(9) 
HEALTH AFF. 1762, 1762-71 (Sept. 2011), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/In-the-Literature/2011/Sep/Reduce-
Uninsured.aspx [hereinafter Reduce Underinsured].  
25. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §1501(a)(2)(B),
124 Stat. 119, 243 (2010) (“Health insurance and health care services are a significant part of the 
national economy.  National health spending is projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000, or 
17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to $4,700,000,000,000 in 2019”); CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
OFFICE, LETTER TO HONORABLE NANCY PELOSI, PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE 
INSURANCE COVERAGE PROVISIONS OF THE RECONCILIATION LEGISLATION COMBINED WITH H.R. 
3590 AS PASSED BY THE SENATE (MARCH 18, 2010), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11355/hr4872.pdf  (showing health care spending is 
expected to grow to over twenty percent of American economy by 2020); CTR’S FOR MEDICARE 
AND MEDICAID SERVICES, NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2010-2011 (showing 
health care spending is expected to grow to nearly twenty percent of U.S. GDP by 2020), available 
at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2010.pdf. 
26. See Christopher Chantrill, US Health Spending, GOV’T SPENDING IN AM., 
http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/us_health_care_spending_10.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2012) (showing health care expenditures as the largest single expenditure in federal spending); 
Andrew J. Rettenmeier, Health Care Spending Forecasts, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (April 
23, 2009), http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba654. Rettenmeier states: 
Given that 45 percent of health care spending is currently funded by government payers, 
future budget implications are staggering.  For example, in addition to dedicated payroll 
taxes and premium payments, federal spending on Medicare will:  
• Require funding equal to 36 percent of federal income taxes by 2030, based
on the CMS forecast; and 
• Require funding equal to almost 70 percent of federal income taxes by
midcentury, based on the CBO forecast.
27. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §1501(a)(2)(E) (“Half of all personal
bankruptcies are caused in part by medical expenses.”); David U. Himmelstein, Deborah Thorne, 
Elizabeth Warren & Steffi Woolhandler, Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of 
a National Study, 122(8) AM. J. MED. 741, 741-46 (2009), available at 
http://www.pnhp.org/new_bankruptcy_study/Bankruptcy-2009.pdf (stating, “62.1% of all 
bankruptcies in 2007 were medical; 92% of these medical debtors had medical debts over $5000, or 
10% of pretax family income.”). 
28. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, HEALTH CARE COSTS: A PRIMER 18 (May 2012),
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yawning gap between high-income and low-income Americans in their 
access to health care.29  The United States spends twice as much per 
capita on health care as other countries, but the members of its 
workforce have shorter lives and are less healthy while they are alive.30 
These problems have to be resolved or the United States will cease 
to be economically competitive with other nations. 
In spite of the serious—even grave—medical and economic 
challenges that the PPACA was designed to address, the 
constitutionality of the “individual mandate,” a key provision of the 
Affordable Care Act, was challenged, not on realistic grounds, but for 
semantic and formalistic reasons.  In his interpretation of the General 
Welfare Clause, Chief Justice Roberts rejected these formalistic 
approaches to constitutional interpretation.  He upheld the individual 
mandate because he chose to focus on the law’s actual operation, not the 
label that Congress attached to it.  His analysis made constitutionality 
turn upon the actual effect of the law, not the category that it might be 
relegated to. 
Furthermore, in his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts repeatedly 
acknowledged the limited role that the courts must play in determining 
the constitutionality of laws like this.31  In cases affecting the 
constitutional rights of individuals or relatively powerless minority 
groups, the courts must play a vital role.32  In such cases, the courts must 
stand between the government and its citizens, and carefully scrutinize 
laws that threaten our individual rights or unfairly discriminate against 
classes of persons.33  But economic legislation is presumed 
available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7670-03.pdf. 
29. See Sara Collins, Michelle Doty, Ruth Robertson & Tracy Garber, Help on the Horizon: 
How the Recession Has Left Millions of Workers Without Health Insurance, and How Health 
Reform Will Bring –Relief—Findings from The Commonwealth Fund Biennial Health Insurance 
Survey of 2010, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Mar. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2011/Mar/Help-on-the-
Horizon.aspx?page=all [hereinafter Help on the Horizon]. 
30. See notes 21-24 supra and accompanying text.  See also Mark Pearson, Written Statement 
to Special Senate Commission on Aging: Disparities in health expenditure across OECD countries: 
Why does the United States spend so much more than other countries?, ORG. FOR ECON. & COOP. 
DEV. (Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/5/34/43800977.pdf. 
31. See notes 88-104 infra and accompanying text.
32. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (announcing that,
while the constitutionality of economic legislation is to be evaluated under the rational basis test, 
laws affecting political rights, infringing the protections of the Bill of Rights, or invading the rights 
of “discrete and insular” minority groups would “be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny”). 
33. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 503-07 (1965) (invoking “strict 
scrutiny” in striking down a state statute making it illegal to use birth control); Harper v. Va. State 
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-71 (1966) (invoking strict scrutiny in striking down state poll 
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constitutional because the adoption of economic policy is a legislative 
and not a judicial function.34  The purpose of economic policy is to 
adjust and compromise the interests of various groups in society, and the 
courts are institutionally incapable of making such adjustments and 
compromises.35  The decision of the Supreme Court in this case reflects 
the fundamental principle that the courts are prohibited from resolving 
questions of economic policy.  Instead, these questions represent 
political judgments that are committed to the legislative process. 
III. THE INTRODUCTION TO CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS’ OPINION
The introductory portion of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion is 
written for a general audience.  This portion of Roberts’ opinion is 
joined by no other justice and does not directly address the issue before 
the Court: the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.36  However, 
Roberts’ introductory remarks may well be remembered long after the 
nation has ceased to discuss the constitutionality of universal health care 
legislation. 
This portion of Roberts’ opinion is a primer on the structural 
principles of the United States Constitution—the concepts of federalism, 
enumeration of powers, and separation of powers.37  It is clear, concise, 
and convincing.  It deals with the fundamental principles of American 
Constitutional Law, yet it is written in such a simple, straightforward 
style that it could be included in a textbook for elementary school 
students.  Chief Justice Roberts’ language is not poetic or uplifting.  He 
lacks the eloquence of Louis Brandeis, Oliver Wendell Holmes, or 
Robert Jackson.  But while he may not inspire, he does inform. 
Furthermore, in the introduction Roberts foreshadows his ruling 
upholding the Affordable Care Act.38  Notice how the following passage 
references not only the constitutional limits on the power of Congress 
tax); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (employing “intermediate scrutiny” in declaring 
that it was unconstitutional for a public university to refuse to admit women). 
34. See, e.g., Carolene Products, 304 U.S. at 152 (“[R]egulatory legislation affecting
ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the 
facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it 
rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.”). 
35. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942) (“The conflicts of economic
interest between the regulated and those who advantage by it are wisely left under our system to 
resolution by the Congress under its more flexible and responsible legislative process. Such 
conflicts rarely lend themselves to judicial determination.”).  
36. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2577-80 (2012).
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
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but also the limits on the power of the courts: 
In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited 
powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.  Nearly two 
centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that “the question 
respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” to the Federal 
Government “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to 
arise, as long as our system shall exist.”  McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 
Wheat. 316, 405, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819).  In this case we must again 
determine whether the Constitution grants Congress powers it now 
asserts, but which many States and individuals believe it does not 
possess.  Resolving this controversy requires us to examine both the 
limits of the Government’s power, and our own limited role in policing 
those boundaries.39 
In the course of the introduction, Chief Justice Roberts discusses 
the handful of enumerated powers of Congress that are relevant to this 
case.40  In addition to Congress’s power to regulate economic activity 
under the Commerce Clause41 and its power to enact supplementary 
legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause,42 Roberts offered this 
pithy explanation of Congress’s power under the General Welfare 
Clause—commonly known as the “power of the purse”: “Put simply, 
Congress may tax and spend.  This grant gives the Federal Government 
considerable influence even in areas where it cannot directly regulate. 
The Federal Government may enact a tax on an activity that it cannot 
authorize, forbid, or otherwise control.”43 
Near the close of his introductory remarks, Chief Justice Roberts 
describes the limited role that the courts must play in ruling on the 
constitutionality of laws such as the Affordable Care Act.44  Roberts 
observes that questions of policy are to be determined by the political 
branches in accordance with the political choices of the citizenry: 
Members of this Court are vested with the authority to interpret the 
law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative to make 
policy judgments.  Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation’s 
elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree 
with them.  It is not our job to protect the people from the 
39. Id. at 2577. 
40. Id. at 2577-80. 
41. See id. at 2578-79. 
42. See id. at 2579. 
43. Id.
44. See id. at 2579-80. 
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consequences of their political choices.45 
Roberts’ deference to Congress in this case was enough to tip the 
scales in favor of the law. 
The following portions of this article describe the contrasting 
approaches that Justice Roberts followed and the contradictory results he 
reached in deciding whether the individual mandate is a “tax” for 
statutory and constitutional purposes. 
IV. ROBERTS’ TEXTUAL APPROACH TO INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTI-
INJUNCTION ACT 
In Part II of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that the federal 
Anti-Injunction Act does not bar the courts from hearing this case.46  
The four concurring justices joined this portion of his opinion,47 and the 
four dissenting justices came to the same conclusion.48  In this portion of 
his opinion Chief Justice Roberts avoids policy analysis and instead 
looks to the text of the statute and the intent of Congress to determine 
the meaning of the law.49 
The federal Anti-Injunction Act50 prohibits the courts from hearing 
lawsuits challenging tax laws until the taxes are paid.  If the Anti-
Injunction Act had applied to this case, the plaintiffs could not have filed 
suit until 2014 when the penalty for failing to have health insurance goes 
into effect.51  Both sides in this dispute wanted the courts to determine 
the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act before 2014.52  Because 
both plaintiffs and defendants took the position that the Anti-Injunction 
Act did not apply, the Supreme Court appointed amicus counsel to 
formulate the strongest arguments in support of the proposition that the 
Act does apply and that the courts are prohibited from considering 
challenges to the Act at this time.53 
In addressing this issue, the Supreme Court was called upon to 
interpret both the Affordable Care Act and the Anti-Injunction Act.  
Chief Justice Roberts first addressed the textual argument made by 
amicus counsel: 
45. Id. at 2579. 
46. See id. at 2582-84. 
47. See id. at 2609. 
48. See id. at 2655-56. 
49. See id. at 2582-84. 
50. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7421(a) (West 2013). 
51. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2582. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
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Amicus contends that the Internal Revenue Code treats the penalty as a 
tax, and that the Anti-Injunction Act therefore bars this suit. 
The text of the pertinent statutes suggests otherwise.  The Anti-
Injunction Act applies to suits “for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax.” §7421(a).  Congress, however, 
chose to describe the “[s]hared responsibility payment” imposed 
on those who forgo health insurance not as a “tax,” but as a 
“penalty.”  §§5000A(b), (g)(2).  There is no immediate reason to think 
that a statute applying to “any tax” would apply to a “penalty.” 
Congress’s decision to label this exaction a “penalty” rather than a 
“tax” is significant because the Affordable Care Act describes many 
other exactions it creates as “taxes.”54 
Justice Roberts pointed out that the language of the Internal 
Revenue Code acknowledges the distinction between a tax and a 
penalty: 
In light of the Code’s consistent distinction between the terms “tax” 
and “assessable penalty,” we must accept the Government’s 
interpretation: § 6201(a) instructs the Secretary that his authority to 
assess taxes includes the authority to assess penalties, but it does not 
equate assessable penalties to taxes for other purposes.55 
The court-appointed amicus attorney urged the Court to adopt a 
“functional” definition of whether the individual mandate constitutes a 
tax: “Amicus argues that even though Congress did not label the shared 
responsibility payment a tax, we should treat it as such under the Anti–
Injunction Act because it functions like a tax.”56 
Chief Justice Roberts rejected this “functional approach” to 
interpreting the meaning of the Affordable Care Act and the Anti-
Injunction Act.57  Instead, Roberts looked to more standard forms of 
statutory construction: legislative intent and the text of the statute.58  
Statutes are the voice of the people governing themselves, and in the 
interpretation of statutes, the courts must respect the intent of people’s 
elected representatives.59  In attempting to discern Congress’s intent in 
54. Id. at 2582-83 (emphasis added). 
55. Id. at 2584. 
56. Id. at 2583. 
57. Id. at 2583-84. 
58. Id. 
59. See, e.g., Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION 28-29 (7th ed. 2007).  The authors state: 
An overwhelming majority of judicial opinions considering statutory issues are written 
in the context of legislative intent.  The reason for this lies in an assumption that an 
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the interpretation of the Anti-Injunction Act and the Affordable Care 
Act, Justice Roberts looked primarily to the statutory text, calling it the 
“best evidence of Congress’s intent”: “The Anti-Injunction Act and the 
Affordable Care Act, however, are creatures of Congress’s own creation. 
How they relate to each other is up to Congress, and the best evidence 
of Congress’s intent is the statutory text.”60 
Accordingly, in Part II of his opinion, Justice Roberts utilized a 
textual approach to statutory interpretation in ruling that the individual 
mandate of the Affordable Care Act is not a tax within the meaning of 
the Anti-Injunction Act.61  However, in Part III-C of his opinion, the 
Chief Justice ruled that the individual mandate is a tax within the 
meaning of the General Welfare Clause!62  In arriving at this conclusion, 
Justice Roberts adopted a completely different interpretive approach.  In 
place of a formalistic approach that focused on the words of the statute 
or the intent of Congress, Justice Roberts looked to how the law 
functions—the operation and effect of the law. 
V.  ROBERTS’ “FUNCTIONAL APPROACH” TO THE INTERPRETATION OF 
THE GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE 
As noted above, in Part II of his opinion, Chief Justice Roberts 
ruled that the individual mandate is not a “tax” within the meaning of the 
federal Anti-Injunction Act.63  However, in Part III-C of his opinion, 
Roberts found that the individual mandate is a “tax” within the meaning 
of the General Welfare Clause.64  How did he arrive at this seemingly 
contradictory result? 
This very point was raised at oral argument by Justice Samuel Alito 
in his questioning of Solicitor General Robert Verrilli: 
JUSTICE ALITO: Well, General Verrilli, today you are arguing that 
the penalty is not a tax [under the Anti-Injunction Act].  Tomorrow 
you’re going to be back and you’ll be arguing that the penalty is a tax 
[under the General Welfare Clause]. 
. . . 
Has the Court ever held that something that is a tax for purposes of the 
obligation to construe statutes so that they carry out the will, real or attributed, of the 
lawmaking branch of the government is mandated by principles of separation of powers.  
60. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2583 (emphasis added). 
61. Id. at 2583-84. 
62. Id. at 2600. 
63. Id. at 2583-84. 
64. Id. at 2600. 
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taxing power under the Constitution is not a tax under the Anti-
Injunction Act?65 
General Verrilli’s response to Justice Alito may not be in the hard-
hitting style that appeals to emotion and excites partisans,66 but it is 
honest, nuanced, and elegant.  Verrilli conceded that the Court had never 
ruled that a law could be a tax for purposes of the General Welfare 
Clause and not a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act, however, 
he distinguished questions of statutory interpretation from questions of 
constitutional interpretation: 
GENERAL VERRILLI: No, Justice Alito, but the Court has held in a 
[sic] license tax cases that something can be a constitutional exercise 
of the taxing power whether or not it is called a tax.  And that’s 
because the nature of the inquiry that we will conduct tomorrow is 
different from the nature of the inquiry that we will conduct today. 
Tomorrow the question is whether Congress has the authority under 
the taxing power to enact it and the form of words doesn’t have a 
dispositive effect on that analysis.  Today we are construing statutory 
text where the precise choice of words does have a dispositive effect 
on the analysis.67 
In deciding whether the Anti-Injunction Act applied to this case, 
Justice Roberts observed that this was a matter that was committed 
solely to Congress.68  The Court had to determine whether Congress 
intended to postpone judicial review of the individual mandate of the 
Affordable Care Act until 2014.  It was a matter of congressional intent, 
and in resolving this question, the Court was necessarily bound by the 
words of the relevant statutes.69  On the other hand, whether the General 
Welfare Clause of the Constitution empowers Congress to enact the 
Affordable Care Act is ultimately not a question of statutory 
construction but rather a matter of constitutional interpretation.  The 
General Welfare Clause states: “The Congress shall have Power To lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and 
65. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11-398). 
66. See John M. Broder, Vindication for Maligned Lawyer in Yesterday’s Decision, N.Y.
TIMES (June 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/us/in-health-ruling-vindication-for-
donald-verrilli.html (stating that after oral argument “legal commentators heaped scorn on [Verrilli], 
declaring his performance a ‘train wreck’ and a ‘flameout,’ and he was lampooned by Jon 
Stewart”). 
67. Transcript of Oral Argument at 31-32, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct.
2566 (2012) (No. 11-398). 
68. See supra text accompanying note 60.
69. See supra text accompanying note 60.
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provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United 
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout 
the United States . . . .”70 
This provision of the Constitution grants Congress the power to 
“lay and collect taxes.”71  The constitutionality of the individual mandate 
depends upon whether it is or is not a tax, and that determination is not 
up to Congress.  As Chief Justice Roberts noted, if Congress were to 
enact a law without indicating whether it was a tax, the courts would 
obviously have to determine whether it was a tax in determining whether 
it was a proper enactment under the General Welfare Clause.72  Roberts 
offered the following example: 
An example may help illustrate why labels should not control here.  
Suppose Congress enacted a statute providing that every taxpayer who 
owns a house without energy efficient windows must pay $50 to the 
IRS.  The amount due is adjusted based on factors such as taxable 
income and joint filing status, and is paid along with the taxpayer’s 
income tax return.  Those whose income is below the filing threshold 
need not pay.  The required payment is not called a “tax,” a “penalty,” 
or anything else.  No one would doubt that this law imposed a tax, and 
was within Congress’s power to tax.73 
Roberts then noted that such a law would be a “tax” for 
constitutional purposes even if Congress called it a “penalty.”74  Earlier 
in his opinion, Roberts had observed “Congress cannot change whether 
an exaction is a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes simply by 
describing it as one or the other.”75 
In Part II of his opinion, dealing with statutory construction of the 
Affordable Care Act and the Anti-Injunction Act, Justice Roberts had 
emphasized the importance of the “label” that Congress attached to the 
law: 
Congress’s decision to label this exaction a “penalty” rather than a 
“tax” is significant because the Affordable Care Act describes many 
other exactions it creates as “taxes.”  Where Congress uses certain 
language in one part of a statute and different language in another, it is 
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
71. Id. 
72. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2597-98 (2012).
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 2598 (“That conclusion should not change simply because Congress used the word
‘penalty’ to describe the payment.”). 
75. Id. at 2583. 
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generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally.76 
However, in Part III of his opinion, dealing with the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate, Justice Roberts repeatedly 
and emphatically rejected the contention of the dissent that the question 
could be determined solely by reference to the “label” that Congress 
attached to this enactment.  Roberts stated: 
It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a “penalty,” 
not a “tax.”  But while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti–
Injunction Act, it does not determine whether the payment may be 
viewed as an exercise of Congress’s taxing power.  It is up to Congress 
whether to apply the Anti–Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it 
makes sense to be guided by Congress’s choice of label on that 
question.  That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction 
is within Congress’s constitutional power to tax.77 
The Chief Justice’s “functional approach” consisted of three 
separate arguments.  First, he listed several ways in which the individual 
mandate “looks like a tax”:78 
The exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes on those without health 
insurance looks like a tax in many respects.  The “[s]hared 
responsibility payment,” as the statute entitles it, is paid into the 
Treasury by “taxpayer[s]” when they file their tax returns.  It does not 
apply to individuals who do not pay federal income taxes because their 
household income is less than the filing threshold in the Internal 
Revenue Code.  For taxpayers who do owe the payment, its amount is 
determined by such familiar factors as taxable income, number of 
dependents, and joint filing status.  The requirement to pay is found in 
the Internal Revenue Code and enforced by the IRS, which—as we 
previously explained—must assess and collect it “in the same manner 
as taxes.”  This process yields the essential feature of any tax: it 
produces at least some revenue for the Government.  Indeed, the 
payment is expected to raise about $4 billion per year by 2017.79 
In the second passage, Justice Roberts identified three factors that 
distinguish a “tax” from a “penalty” and found that the individual 
mandate satisfied all three elements.80  A “tax,” reasoned Justice 
Roberts, is in an amount that is not so large as to utterly discourage the 
76. Id. (citation omitted). 
77. Id. at 2594 (internal citation omitted). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. (citations omitted). 
80. See id. at 2595-96. 
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activity altogether; it is collected by the taxing authorities; and it is 
imposed on a strict liability basis regardless of the taxpayer’s state of 
mind or level of culpability.81 
The individual mandate meets all three of these elements: the 
amount that is due is far less than the cost of health insurance,82 the 
amount is collected by the Internal Revenue Service,83 and the amount is 
owed if the taxpayer does not have health insurance, regardless of 
whether this omission was intentional, knowing, reckless, negligent, or 
without any fault of the taxpayer.84 
In the third passage that betokened a “functional approach,” Justice 
Roberts concluded that the individual mandate is not a “penalty” because 
under the Affordable Care Act people who decline to obtain health 
insurance are not considered “outlaws.”85  Instead, the Affordable Care 
Act gives people the choice of either obtaining health insurance or 
paying the amount specified.86  This means that the individual mandate 
was a tax on certain conduct rather than a penalty for violating the law.87 
Another factor that determined the result in this case is that the 
Chief Justice gave the statute the benefit of the doubt.  Roberts’ 
deference to Congress is the subject of the next portion of this essay. 
VI. ROBERTS’ DEFERENCE TO CONGRESS IN DETERMINING THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
One of the most significant factors that drove the Court to 
acknowledge the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act is the 
deference that the Court showed to Congress.  Chief Justice Roberts 
invoked two principles that contributed to this deference: the canon of 
constitutional avoidance and the principle that questions of policy are for 
Congress and not the courts to determine. 
81. See id. at 2595. 
82. See id. at 2595-96. 
83. See id. at 2596. 
84. See id. 
85. Id. at 2596-97.  Justice Roberts stated:
Indeed, it is estimated that four million people each year will choose to pay the IRS 
rather than buy insurance. . . . We would expect Congress to be troubled by that prospect 
if such conduct were unlawful.  That Congress apparently regards such extensive failure 
to comply with the mandate as tolerable suggests that Congress did not think it was 
creating four million outlaws.  It suggests instead that the shared responsibility payment 
merely imposes a tax citizens may lawfully choose to pay in lieu of buying health 
insurance. 
86. See id. 
87. See id. at 2596-2600. 
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American courts have the power of “judicial review”—the authority 
to declare statutes unconstitutional.88  But the principle of Separation of 
Powers cautions respect for the people’s political choices and places a 
brake on the power of judicial review.  One doctrine that was relied upon 
in this case was the interpretive canon of “constitutional avoidance.” 
This is the guideline that instructs the courts to, if possible, construe a 
statute in such a way as to render it constitutional.  As Chief Justice 
Roberts said, “[I]t is well established that if a statute has two possible 
meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt 
the meaning that does not do so.”89  Roberts quoted well-known 
passages by Justices Joseph Story and Oliver Wendell Holmes in 
support of this proposition.90 
In this case, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance enabled the 
Court to uphold the individual mandate as a tax.  Roberts explained that 
even though this might not be “the most natural interpretation of the 
mandate,” nevertheless the Court had the duty to ask whether it was 
“fairly possible” to construe that requirement to be a tax: 
[I]f the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain taxpayers who do 
not have health insurance, it may be within Congress’s constitutional 
power to tax.  The question is not whether that is the most natural 
interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a “fairly possible” 
one.  As we have explained, “every reasonable construction must be 
resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”  The 
Government asks us to interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it 
would otherwise violate the Constitution.91 
Roberts added, “[g]ranting the Act the full measure of deference 
owed to federal statutes, it can be so read . . . .”92 
Roberts’ invocation of “constitutional avoidance” to preserve the 
88. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177-79 (1803) (declaring the power of the courts to 
strike down laws that are unconstitutional); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2579-80 
(acknowledging the same). 
89. 132 S.Ct. at 2593. 
90. Id.  Roberts stated: 
Justice Story said that 180 years ago: “No court ought, unless the terms of an act 
rendered it unavoidable, to give a construction to it which should involve a violation, 
however unintentional, of the constitution.” Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448–449, 7 
L.Ed. 732 (1830).  Justice Holmes made the same point a century later: “[T]he rule is 
settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would 
be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save 
the Act.” Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148, 48 S.Ct. 105, 72 L.Ed. 206 (1927) 
(concurring opinion). 
91. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2594 (citations omitted). 
92. Id. 
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individual mandate of the Affordable Care Act is at all not surprising.  In 
recent years, the Supreme Court has frequently construed statutes so as 
to preserve their constitutionality.93  For example, in 2009 in Northwest 
Austin Utility District No. One v. Holder,94 the Court, in an opinion by 
Chief Justice Roberts, narrowly construed a provision of the 1965 
Voting Rights Act in order to avoid striking it down as 
unconstitutional.95  In his opinion for the Court in Northwest Austin, 
Justice Roberts acknowledged that the doctrine of constitutional 
avoidance arises from the respect that is due Congress as a coequal 
branch: 
We fully appreciate that judging the constitutionality of an Act of 
Congress is “the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called 
on to perform.”  “The Congress is a coequal branch of government 
whose Members take the same oath we do to uphold the Constitution 
of the United States.”96 
The doctrine of constitutional avoidance is not the only interpretive 
principle that restrained the Court’s power of judicial review in this case.  
Of equal or greater importance is the principle that the courts must defer 
to Congress on matters of economic policy, and the individual mandate 
of the Affordable Care Act represents a fundamental decision affecting 
national economic policy.  The ACA seeks to regulate myriad aspects of 
the health care industry, which constitutes one-sixth of the American 
economy.97  Nor was this policy choice lightly taken.  Congress and the 
American people have struggled with the problem of expanding access 
to health care for generations and spent more than a year debating the 
contours of the ACA.98  Nor was the policy choice simple and 
straightforward.  The ACA contains hundreds of provisions, representing 
myriad and complex compromises, balancing the interests of consumers, 
providers, employers, and insurers.99  This law is fraught with vast 
consequences (for good or ill) for the American people. 
93. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S.Ct. 2896, 2929-30 (2010) (narrowly construing
a federal criminal fraud statute to preserve its constitutionality against a vagueness challenge). 
94. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One. v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009). 
95. See id. at 206-11. 
96. Id. at 204-05 (citations omitted). 
97. See supra note 25. 
98. See supra notes 13, 20. 
99. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2670 (2012) (Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting) (describing the “complex” interrelated provisions of the 
law and stating, “the Act attempts to achieve near-universal health insurance coverage by spreading 
its costs to individuals, insurers, governments, hospitals, and employers—while, at the same time, 
offsetting significant portions of those costs with new benefits to each group.”). 
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Over a century ago, in his dissenting opinion in Lochner v. New 
York,100 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes eloquently expressed the 
principle that economic policy is to be determined by the people acting 
through the legislative branch, not by the courts in the interpretation of 
the Constitution: 
[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic 
theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to 
the state or of laissez faire.  It is made for people of fundamentally 
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural 
and familiar, or novel, and even shocking, ought not to conclude our 
judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict 
with the Constitution of the United States.101 
After 1937, the Supreme Court embraced Holmes’ understanding of 
the Constitution, and it has reiterated this principle innumerable times.102  
At several points in his opinion, Justice Roberts acknowledged that 
questions of policy are left to Congress, not to the courts.  In the 
introduction to his opinion, Roberts stated: 
Our permissive reading of these powers is explained in part by a 
general reticence to invalidate the acts of the Nation’s elected leaders. 
“Proper respect for a coordinate branch of the government” requires 
that we strike down an Act of Congress only if “the lack of 
constitutional authority to pass [the] act in question is clearly 
demonstrated.”  Members of this Court are vested with the authority to 
interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the prerogative 
to make policy judgments.  Those decisions are entrusted to our 
Nation’s elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people 
disagree with them.  It is not our job to protect the people from the 
consequences of their political choices.103 
Deferring to Congress, Justice Roberts concluded that the 
individual mandate could reasonably be construed as a tax and that it 
 100.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (striking down maximum hour law as 
unconstitutional). 
101.  Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 102.  See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“We have returned to the 
original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for 
the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.”).  See generally Brief for 
Constitutional Law and Economics Professors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners (Minimum 
Coverage Provision) at 2, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566 (2012) (No. 11-
398) (contending that “[t]he principle of Separation of Powers requires the courts to defer to 
Congress on questions of economic policy.”). 
103.  See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S.Ct. at 2579 (citation omitted). 
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was constitutional.104 
VII. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice John Roberts upheld the individual mandate of the 
Affordable Care Act because he rejected formalism and embraced 
realism in constitutional analysis, and because he deferred to Congress, 
acknowledging its right to make policy choices. 
There are several other significant aspects of Justice Roberts’ ruling 
upholding the individual mandate.  For instance, Justice Roberts 
reaffirmed the principle that Congress has the power to impose 
“regulatory taxes” under the General Welfare Clause,105 and he 
contended that the power to tax is narrower than the power to 
regulate106—but those points will have to be addressed in another article. 
 104.  Id. at 2608 (“In this case, however, it is reasonable to construe what Congress has done as 
increasing taxes on those who have a certain amount of income, but choose to go without health 
insurance.  Such legislation is within Congress’s power to tax.”). 
 105.  See id. at 2596 (“Indeed, ‘[e]very tax is in some measure regulatory.  To some extent it 
interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.’  
Sonzinsky, supra, at 513, 57 S.Ct. 554.  That [the individual mandate] seeks to shape decisions 
about whether to buy health insurance does not mean that it cannot be a valid exercise of the taxing 
power.”). 
 106.  See id. at 2600 (“[A]lthough the breadth of Congress’s power to tax is greater than its 
power to regulate commerce, the taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of control 
over individual behavior.”). 
